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Motivated by the investor sentiment literature and assuming that terrorist activity 
influences investor mood the paper explores whether terrorism exerts a significant 
negative impact on daily stock market returns for a sample of 22 countries. The employed 
empirical specifications are based on flexible versions of the World CAPM allowing for 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. The results suggest that terrorist activity 
leads to significantly lower returns on the day of terrorist attack occurrence. In addition, 
the negative effect of terrorist activity is substantially amplified as the level of 
psychosocial effects increases. On the one hand this evidence sheds light to the 
underlying mechanism via which terrorism affects stock markets while on the other hand 
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1. Introduction 
The relative easiness of buying and selling stocks results in their prices being very 
sensitive to the revelation of new information. This property generally manifests itself in 
the occurrence of unforeseen events and especially in the case of adverse shocks such as 
mega
1-terrorist incidents. For instance, on September 11
th 2001 the day of the Twin 
Towers terrorist attacks the MSCI World Index lost 1.98 % of its value even though the 
US stock market did not operate. A second round loss of 2.57 % was recorded on the 
September 17
th when the US market re-opened. Similarly, on March 11
th 2004 the day of 
the Madrid attacks the MSCI fell by 1.72 %. To appreciate the significance of these 
market reactions perhaps two pieces of information would suffice. First, the average daily 
change of the MSCI World Index for the period 1994-2004 was 0.027 %. Second, the 
losses on these three days make it in the top 100 worst trading days in terms of returns 
during this 11-year period (the September 17
th, September 11




th and the 94
th worst trading days respectively). The unfavorable 
impact on stock markets caused by mega-terrorist events has also been empirically 
documented with formal econometric models in the extant literature (Carter and Simkins 
2004; Chen and Siems 2004; Drakos 2004; Eldor and Melnick 2004; Gulley and Sultan 
2006; Amélie and Darné 2006; Chesney and Reshetar 2007; Nikkinen et al., 2008).  
However, the literature has not so far investigated whether the overall terrorist 
activity exerts any systematic effect on stock markets. A plausible channel via which 
terrorist activity could exert a negative impact on stock market returns is through investor 
sentiment. In particular, if terrorist attacks were a mood proxy then their occurrence is   3
expected to deteriorate investor sentiment and consequently put a downward pressure on 
stock prices.  
   The paper makes a twofold contribution to the literature. First, in contrast to 
previous research that has focused on selected major terrorist acts, it tests whether the 
overall terrorist activity significantly affects stock returns. This is done for a large 
number of countries and a large time span using an econometric framework that controls 
for global risk factors. Second, by linking terrorism to investor mood it derives testable 
hypotheses that relate directly to the investor sentiment literature. In particular, apart 
from the investigation of the potential negative effect of terrorism on stock returns, it also 
explores whether this effect is a function of the level of psychosocial impact caused by 
terrorist incidents.              
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the a priori 
motivations for exploring the link between terrorism and stock returns. Section 3 
discusses the econometric methodology and the hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 
describes the data used in the subsequent analysis. Section 5 presents and discusses the 
empirical findings and finally Section 6 concludes.           
2.   Motivation 
 There is a burgeoning literature exploring the asset pricing impact of several 
behavioral biases (for extensive and in depth reviews see Hirshleifer 2001; Shiller 2003; 
Stracca, 2004). A strand of this literature has documented various exogenous factors that 
capture mood (and therefore investor sentiment) as being correlated with stock returns. 
These exogenous factors could be part of what Rick and Lowenstein (2007) describe as 
incidental emotion influences on risky decision making. As mood indicators previous   4
research has utilized a variety of variables such as sunshine (Saunders 1993; Hirshleifer 
and Shumway 2003), sleep patterns (Kamstra et al, 2000), temperature (Cao and Wei 
2005), daylight (Kamstra et al, 2003), lunar phases (Yuan et al, 2006), and international 
soccer results (Edmans et al, 2007).  
The core question is whether one can consider terrorist activity as a mood proxy. 
Edmans et al. (2007) argue that the chosen mood indicator must satisfy three criteria to 
rationalize its link with stock returns. First, the selected variable must drive mood in a 
substantial and unambiguous manner, so that its effect is vigorous enough to be reflected 
in asset prices. Second, the variable must affect the mood of a large proportion of the 
population so it is likely to influence investors. Third, the effect must be correlated across 
the majority of individuals within a country.  
Terrorist events, that are by default unforeseen exogenous to the stock market 
shocks, seem the ideal candidate as a proxy for investor mood satisfying all three criteria. 
In fact it is rather hard to think of other (social) events causing so pronounced and highly 
correlated mood swings within a country’s population. Under the null hypothesis of 
Market Efficiency terrorist activity should not affect stock returns. The alternative, that 
terrorist incidents significantly affect stock returns, would be compatible with models of 
investor sentiment. Moreover if investor sentiment was affected by terrorism one could 
impose further structure on the potential effects. First, on trading days that terrorist 
incidents have occurred risk-adjusted returns should be significantly lower. Second, the 
(absolute) impact on stock returns should be an increasing function of the degree of the 
event’s severity. The negative impact on returns is expected since terrorist activity is 
assumed to induce a deterioration of sentiment. The dependence of the effect on severity   5
captures the extent that the population is affected and also whether it is correlated across 
individuals. Clearly as the severity of a terrorist incident increases so does the likelihood 
that it affects, and in the same direction, a higher proportion of the population. 
3.   Econometric Methodology and Hypotheses  
We proceed by considering terrorist activity ( ) , it terr  as a one-sided risk producing 
potentially adverse effects on the stock market (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2008). We 
assume that it is a random variable following a Bernoulli process where with probability 
( ) , it p  a terrorist incident takes place in country ( ) i  and day ( ) t . We define an indicator 
variable which is constructed from observed terrorist activity across time and countries 
and corresponds to realizations of this Bernoulli process. Hence the indicator variable is 
defined as follows: 
,
1,   if a terrorist incident took place in country   in time   




   =   
                  (1)     
As discussed earlier one expects that certain terrorist incidents of extreme severity 
and audacity might produce a higher (negative) impact compared to the average terrorist 
attack. To this end we will distinguish between terrorist incidents that had none or minor 
or moderate or major psychosocial impacts. Our prior is that terrorist activity’s negative 
effect on stock markets will be exacerbated as the incidents are of higher severity. Thus, 
conditional on the occurrence of a terrorist incident we define three dichotomous 
variables capturing the level of psychosocial impact it caused as follows: 
,
1,   if the incident caused a major psychosocial impact 
0,  otherwise 
it MAJ
   =   
                             (2) 
,
1,   if the incident caused a moderate psychosocial impact 
0,  otherwise 
it MOD
   =   
                (3)   6
,
1,   if the incident caused a minor psychosocial impact 
0,  otherwise 
it MIN
   =   
                (4) 
,
1,   if the incident caused no psychosocial impact 
0,  otherwise 
it NON
   =   
                  (5) 
Now consider a vector of stock market index prices, ( ) , it I , where () i  and ( ) t  















                            (6) 
We begin by employing a one-factor setting where the relevant source of global 
risk is a benchmark portfolio proxied by the world equity market portfolio
2. In this 
context Grauer et al. (1976) and Adler and Dumas (1983) have shown that the global 
value-weighted market portfolio is the relevant risk factor. Assuming that investors do 
not hedge against exchange rate risks and a risk-free asset exists the conditional version 
of the world CAPM implies the following behavior for excess returns:  
() ( ) ,, 1 ,, , i t WRF t WMP t WRF t i t E RR c E R R u    −= −+                                      (7) 
     
where  E  stands for the expectations operator, ( ) , WMP t R  is the daily return on the World 
Market Portfolio ( ) t WMP ,  () , WRF t R  denotes the world risk-free rate,  , it u  is a random 
disturbance term and c is a constant estimable parameter.    
The actual empirical specification we use is rather more flexible allowing, not 
only for contemporaneous sensitivity, but also for a dynamic relationship between () , it R  
and ( ) , WMP t R  where lagged values (of order  J ) of the latter will be included as regressors 
in the model. Additionally, we allow ( ) , it R  to exhibit an autoregressive component of   7
order  ( ) N . We further augment the model with fixed time-effects denoted by () year  to 
capture aggregate conditions that may change from year to year. Furthermore, the 
empirical finance literature has established that the return generation process is not 
uniform across months in a given year and/or across days in a given week. These two 
effects that typically are considered as calendar anomalies are known as month and day 
of the week effects (French 1980; Gibbons and Hess 1981; Jaffe and Westerfield 1985; 
Kato and Shallheim 1985; Board and Sutcliffe 1988; Choudhry 2001). To take these 
potential effects into account we construct two sets of dummies. A set of five dummies 
() ., dit day  whose typical element attains the value of unity on a given day of the week and 
zero otherwise. Similarly () ,, mit month  stands for a set of twelve dummies whose typical 
element attains the value of unity on a given month of the year and zero otherwise.  
Thus the model specification is: 
() () ( ) ( )
()
11
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Given the panel dimension we condition on country heterogeneity allowing for an 
unobserved effect  i µ  treated as random, assuming that  ( ) , 0      , , it j i E Ri j t µ − =∀ . 
The parameter of interest is ( ) 1 α  whose significance and sign will shed light on 
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In order to test the potential dependence of investor sentiment on the severity of terrorist 
incidents we break down the set of terrorist events into three mutually exclusive parts 
each one identifying a given level of severity using the four dummies defined in (2)-(5). 
The model then becomes:  
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
()( )( )
** **
,0 1 ,2 ,3 ,4 , , ,
01
11 4
,, ,, ,, ,
11 1
           +
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km d
R NON MIN MOD MAJ R R
year month day
αα α α α β φ










                                         (9) 
Moreover, given that the psychosocial dummies attain the value of unity if and 
only if a terrorist incident has taken place model (9) is equivalent to model (8). In other 
words, if the variation of terrorist activity explained part of the variation in daily returns, 
i.e. if () 1 α  (from equation 8) turns out to be significant, so will ( )
****
1234 α ααα +++  and they 
will also carry the same sign. Hence we expect to reject the hypothesis 
( )
****
01234 :0 H αααα +++ =  in favor of the alternative  ( )
****
11234 :0 H αααα + ++ < .  
Additionally if the level of psychosocial impact drives investor sentiment we also 
expect to reject the joint hypotheses  
****
01 2 3 4 :0 H αααα = ===  in favor of the alternative 
that at least one parameter is significantly negative. Finally we also expect that 
****
1234 α ααα <<< implying that the negative effect on returns increases monotonically 
with the level of deterioration in investor sentiment as proxied by the psychosocial 
impact of terrorist attacks.   
      A well established empirical regularity is the volatility clustering exhibited by 
daily returns (Engle 1982; Bollerslev 1986). Thus, in order to control for this we employ 
a Pooled Panel GARCH (PP-GARCH hereafter) model for the conditional volatility of   9
stock returns (Cermeno and Grier 2006). Although multivariate GARCH models are also 
available they are not practical for most panel applications because they require the 
estimation of a large number of parameters which consumes degrees of freedom rapidly. 
In contrast, PP-GARCH estimation by imposing common dynamics on the variance-
covariance process across cross-sectional units reduces the number of parameters 
dramatically ensuring parsimony. Furthermore, the PP-GARCH model does not imply 
constant cross-sectional correlation over time. We then allow a more flexible 
specification for the error term with:  
() , 0 it E ε =  and  ()
22
,, it it E ε σ =  
In particular, assuming that  ,, ~0 , it it N ε   Ω  , i.e. are multivariate normal error 
terms with a time-varying conditional variance-covariance matrix produces a PP-
GARCH model (Cermeno and Grier 2006). The variance-covariance matrix  , it Ω  is time-





,, 0 ,, , ,
11
,  for   
NL
it n it n l it l
nl
p k
ij t n ij tn mi tm j tm
nm
ij
σφ φ σ η ν









                  (10) 
             
where the 
* φ ’s, ψ ’s, η’s and ρ ’s denote unknown constant parameters to be estimated.   
4.  Data Sources and Variables Description 
4.1 Terrorist  Activity   
The most recent and complete terrorism database is the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) developed at the University of Maryland, containing both domestic and   10
international incidents. The database consists of two parts (GTD1)
3 that records 
worldwide events for the period 1970 to 1997
4 and (GTD2)
5 for the period 1998 to 2004. 
We collect information regarding the exact calendar date (year, month, day) and the 
location (country) of terrorist incidents.  
Table 1 reports the top 40 countries in terms of the count of terrorist incidents 
they witnessed during the period under consideration
6. Between them they account for 
about 86 % of total worldwide terrorist activity in the period 1994-2004. Colombia (9.20 
%), India (7.17 %), Algeria (7.08 %), and Pakistan (6.75 %) are the countries with the 
highest shares of terrorist activity. The countries with the lowest shares are Brazil (0.60 
%), Venezuela (0.56 %), Angola (0.53 %) and Yemen (0.50 %).          
----------Table 1---------- 
The  GTD also provides information regarding the psychosocial impacts of 
terrorist attacks classifying them as having none, minor, moderate, or major impact. 
However this information has been recorded only for the post 1998 period. According to 
the GTD manual:  
“Where the source materials contain relevant information, the extent of the psychological 
/social damage brought about by the incident is estimated. This applies to short-term consequences of 
the incident (days to weeks) rather than long-term societal changes. This variable includes the 
following values: Major (Far-reaching – national or international – effects; tangible changes in 
behavior of the majority of the affected public, including symptoms of Post-traumatic Stress 
Disorder, or Acute Stress Disorder), Moderate (General anxiety and unease, but significant 
psychosocial effects and/or behavioral changes among a subset or minority of the exposed public), 
Minor (Some anxiety or unease, without any significant behavioral changes), None”. 
Figures 1 and 2 depict the distribution of attacks with major and moderate 
psychosocial impacts across years and countries respectively. The countries with the   11
highest number of incidents with major psychosocial impact are the USA (8), Russia (5), 
and Israel (3).    
    ----------Figure 1---------- 
   ----------Figure 2---------- 
4.2 Stock  Markets   
Daily closing prices from 3/1/1994 to 30/12/2004 in local currencies for broad 
stock market indices where obtained from Datastream. Due to data unavailability for 
various countries we are left with 22 indices namely: Bovespa (Brazil), IGBC INDEX 
(Colombia), Hermes (Egypt), CAC 40 (France), DAX 30 (Germany), Athex Composite 
(Greece), BSE (India), Jakarta SE Composite (Indonesia), Israel TA 100 (Israel), Blom 
(Lebanon), IPC BOLSA (Mexico), Karachi SE 100 (Pakistan), Lima SE General IGBL 
(Peru), SE-IPSEi (Philippines), RTS INDEX (Russia), Madrid SE General (Spain), 
Colombo SE All Share (Sri Lanka), Bangkok SET (Thailand), ISE NATIONAL 100 
(Turkey), FTSE All Share (UK), NYSE Composite (USA), Venezuela SE General 
(Venezuela). Table 2 provides the main descriptive statistics for countries’ daily returns.   
----------Table 2---------- 
Returns across all countries share the common characteristic of significant 
deviations from normality, which is a usual property of daily returns. In particular for 
each country the return series is leptokurtic indicative of ‘fat tails’. For Germany, India, 
Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Spain, UK and USA skewness attains negative values indicating 
that their returns’ distributions are left-skewed while for the remaining countries 
skewness is positive and therefore return distributions are right-skewed.    12
Our basic empirical specification assumes a single risk factor corresponding to the 
global equity market portfolio, which we proxy by the World Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI World) equity market index. In a later section we conduct sensitivity 
analysis by assuming a three-factor model where we augment the one factor model with:  
•  () , WM t SMB  defined as the difference between the return on a portfolio of small 
capitalization stocks and the return on a portfolio of large capitalization stocks (SMB, 
small minus big), and  
•  () , WM t HML  defined as the difference between the return on a portfolio of high book-
to-market stocks (value) and the return on low book-to-market (growth) stocks 
(HML, high minus low), which proxies the value or distress premium.  
Data construction was based on the World Morgan Stanley Capital International, 
Small, Large, Value and Growth indices. Descriptive statistics for the three factors’ 
daily returns (and their constituents) are given in Table 3. Similar to the national market 
returns the sample properties of the benchmarks portfolios show substantial deviations 
from normality, while all of them are leptokurtic.        
----------Table 3---------- 
Table 4 shows the total number of terrorist attacks as well as the number of 
trading days on which they occurred for the list of countries comprising the sample to be 
analyzed.  
----------Table 4---------- 
The countries in the sample account for just above 71 % of worldwide terrorist 
incidents (10282 / 14402). The number of trading days in which terrorist attacks occurred 
differs from the number of attacks simply because there are several instances that   13
multiple attacks took place in a given day. The ratio of the number of trading days that 
attacks occurred over the total number of trading days provides a rough estimate of the 
unconditional probability of terrorist attack occurrence. The average unconditional 
probability that at least one terrorist attack will occur in a given trading day across the 22 
countries is about 7.5 % with an unconditional standard deviation of about 4.5 %.  This 
shows that terrorist activity is a relatively frequent phenomenon for these countries. In 
fact for India the probability is above 21 %, for Pakistan is almost 14 %, for Russia 
11.5%, for Colombia, Turkey, UK is 11%, while for Philippines and Sri Lanka is just 
above 10 %. Thailand, Venezuela and Brazil are associated with the lowest probabilities 
of terrorist occurrence with 2.67 %, 2.42 %, and 2.32 % respectively.         
5.   Terrorism and Stock Returns: Empirical Results 
Table 5 reports the estimation results from three alternative specifications based 
on the one-factor world CAPM estimated by Random-Effects, and two pooled 
regressions allowing for ARCH(1) and ARCH(2) processes. Note also that we set all 
dynamics to five lags. According to the results ARCH effects are significant verifying the 
sample properties discussed earlier and furthermore based on a Likelihood Ratio test the 
PP-ARCH(2) outperforms the PP-ARCH(1). Thus, the quantification of terrorism’s 
effects on stock returns is based on the PP-ARCH(2) specification.  
National returns are significantly affected by the world market portfolio return 
whose impact declines monotonically with the lag order. In addition, national returns 
exhibit a significant autoregressive component where the first and fourth lag enter the 
models positively while the second, third and fifth negatively. As it regards to the 
coefficient of terrorist activity it attains significantly negative signs in all three   14
specifications. The point estimate of the terrorist occurrence variable suggests that the 
average reduction in stock returns is about -0.049 %.These findings suggest that national 
returns are significantly lower on days of terrorist attack occurrences and therefore 
provide prima facie evidence in favor of the sentiment mechanism.      
----------Table 5---------- 
5.1 Sensitivity  analysis:  Three-Factor Model and Financial 
Crises 
In this section we investigate the robustness of our previously reported findings 
by employing alternative model specifications. First, we extend the return generating 
process by considering that international returns are driven by a world version of the 
three-factor model (Fama and French 1993, 1996). The conditional version of the three-
factor model is as follows:    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, ,, , , , i t WRF t WMP t WRF t WM t WM t i t E RR E R R H M L S M B u βθ ω    −= −+ + +                             (11) 
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          (12) 
 
To further explore the robustness of results we control for various financial 
shocks that had global impacts. In particular we identify four such shocks: the Mexican 
Peso Crisis, the Asian Crisis, the Russian Crisis and the recent corporate scandals (Enron, 
Worldcom). We construct four dummies that attain the values of unity as follows: 
() mexican  for the period 20/12/1994 to 31/1/1995, ( ) asian  for the period 2/07/1997 to   15
3/12/1997,  () russian  for the period 11/08/1998 to 15/01/1999, and ( ) scandals  (Enron, 
worldcom) for the period 15/4/2002 to 24/07/2002. Hence we augment the model 
appearing in (8) with the crises dummies and report estimation results in Table 6
7.    
----------Table 6---------- 
Regardless of model specification terrorist activity continues to enter the model 
with a significantly negative coefficient. In particular, the estimated coefficient is 
strikingly robust across specifications where the occurrence of terrorist attacks reduces 
daily returns by an average of 0.042 percent and 0.046 percent based on the three-factor 
model and the three factor model controlling for global financial crises respectively.  
5.2  Terrorism and Stock Returns by level of Psychosocial 
Impact  
In this section we explore the possibility that terrorism’s effect on stock returns is 
related to the level of psychosocial impact. If indeed a sentiment mechanism was 
responsible for the observed negative relationship between terrorism and returns one 
would expect the level of psychosocial impact to be crucial. In other words, it is plausible 
to expect that the effect of terrorist incidents is not uniform across levels of psychosocial 
impact. In fact we anticipate that the absolute effect monotonically increases with the 
degree of psychosocial impact. In Table 7 we report the estimation results based on the 
PP-ARCH(2) specification for the one-factor model and the three-factor model (with and 
without the crises dummies). Note that the sample corresponds to 1998-2004 since the 
psychosocial impact variable was not coded for the earlier period.  
Irrespectively of which specification is employed the results are qualitatively 
similar. The null hypothesis that the sum of the psychosocial dummies is zero is 
comfortably rejected verifying the finding that daily returns are correlated with the   16
overall terrorist activity. In addition the null that all psychosocial dummies’ coefficients 
are insignificant is emphatically rejected suggesting that the effect on returns is not 
uniform across levels of psychosocial impact. Inspecting the relevant coefficients 
individually we see that the coefficients of each level of psychosocial impact dummies 
are negative, although the coefficients of attacks with no and moderate impact are 
insignificant. As for the remaining two coefficients we find that terrorist incidents with 
minor psychosocial impact reduce returns on average by approximately 0.07 percent 
while the reduction in the occurrence of incidents with major psychosocial impact is 
estimated as being approximately 0.60 indicating that the effect of the latter is about eight 
times higher of the former. The finding of a differential effect of terrorist incidents, which 
is increasing in the level of psychosocial impact, is compatible with an underlying 
sentiment mechanism.                           
 ----------Table 7---------- 
6. Conclusions 
The analysis explored whether terrorist activity exerted a significant impact on 
daily stock market returns for a sample of 22 countries who witnessed a large share of 
worldwide terrorist activity in the period 1994-2004. The employed empirical 
specifications were based on flexible versions of the World CAPM allowing for 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. The theoretical motivation was provided by 
the investor sentiment literature where terrorist activity was assumed to impact on 
investor mood. The results suggest that terrorist activity indeed leads to significantly 
lower returns on the day of terrorist attack occurrence. In addition, the negative effect of 
terrorist activity is substantially amplified when terrorist incidents cause higher   17
psychosocial impact. On the one hand this evidence sheds light to the underlying 
mechanism via which terrorism affects stock markets while on the other hand provides 
empirical support for the sentiment effect.       
                                  18
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Table 1. Top 40 Countries in terms of total terrorist incidents (1994-2004)
 a,b 





total incidents  Cumulative % 
Colombia  1543 1543  9.20 9.20 
India  1203 2746  7.17 16.37 
Algeria  1188 3934  7.08 23.46 
Pakistan  1132 5066  6.75 30.21 
Turkey  649 5715  3.87  34.08 
Philippines  548 6263  3.26  37.35 
UK  538 6801  3.20  40.56 
France  527 7328  3.14  43.70 
Sri Lanka  517 7845  3.08  46.79 
Russia  514 8359  3.06  49.85 
Spain  420 8779  2.57  52.36 
Israel  402 9181  2.39  54.75 
Palestine  345 9526  2.05  56.81 
Egypt  326 9852  1.94  58.76 
Iraq  291 10143  1.73 60.49 
South Africa  279 10422  1.66 62.16 
Bangladesh  275 10697  1.64 63.80 
Germany  274 10971  1.63 65.43 
Mexico  258 11229  1.53 66.97 
Lebanon  249 11478  1.48 68.45 
Indonesia  236 11714  1.40 69.86 
Burundi  230 11944  1.37 71.23 
Peru  220 12164  1.31 72.55 
Greece  203 12367  1.21 73.76 
USA  200 12567  1.19 74.95 
Afghanistan  189 12756  1.12 76.08 
Guatemala  170 12926  1.01 77.09 
Uganda  157 13083  0.93 78.03 
Tajikistan  136 13219  0.81 78.84 
Haiti  128 13347  0.76 79.60 
Thailand  126 13473  0.75 80.35 
Somalia  116 13589  0.69 81.05 
Nepal  115 13704  0.68 81.73 
Cambodia  114 13818  0.67 82.41 
Rwanda  110 13928  0.65 83.07 
FYROM  103 14031  0.61 83.68 
Brazil  102 14133  0.60 84.29 
Venezuela  95 14228  0.56  84.86 
Angola  89 14317  0.53  85.39 
Yemen  85 14406  0.50  85.90 
Notes: 
a)  Terrorism data are based on the Global Terrorism Databases 1 and 2 compiled by the University of Maryland. 
b)  Terrorist incidents correspond to the sum of domestic and transnational activity. 
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Table 2. Returns’ Descriptive Statistics 
Country 
(Stock Index)  Mean








0.182 33.39  -15.82 2.65 1.11  17.90  27159.1 
Colombia 
(COLOMBIA IGBC)  0.167 9.30  -6.17 1.15 0.79  13.98  4688.2 
Egypt 
(EGYPT HERMES) 
0.045 14.68  -12.01 1.32 0.88  17.04  21791.1 
France 
(CAC40)  0.027 7.25  -7.39 1.40 0.01  5.50  749.2 
Germany 
(DAX)  0.034 7.84  -6.43 1.55  -0.03  5.46  702.2 
Greece 
(ATHEX COMPOSITE)  0.047 7.96  -9.23 1.62 0.10  7.01  1931.1 
India 
(INDIA BSE)  0.034 8.97  -11.13  1.55  -0.03  6.67  1611.1 
Indonesia 
(JAKARTA SE COMPOSITE)  0.031 14.02  -11.95 1.64 0.34  12.10  9966.8 
Israel 
(ISRAEL TA 100)  0.042 10.08  -9.93 1.42 -0.11  8.41  3511.1 
Lebanon 
(LEBANON BLOM)  -0.013 6.62  -5.37 1.09 0.54  7.44  2036.8 
Mexico 
(MEXICO IPC)  0.071 12.92  -13.33 1.68 0.23  9.07  4435.9 
Pakistan 
(KARACHI SE 100)  0.050 13.61  -12.37 1.67 -0.11  10.02  5907.2 
Peru 
(LIMA SE GENERAL)  0.054 7.81  -8.41 1.17 0.09  9.98  5843.9 
Philippines 
(PHILIPPINE SE)  -0.009 17.55  -9.28  1.50  1.08  17.88  27054.4 
Russia 
(RUSSIA RTS)  0.118 16.83  -19.02 2.96 -0.09  8.41  2973.1 
Spain 
(MADRID SE GENERAL)  0.045 5.89  -6.49 1.22  -0.14  5.53  778.8 
Sri Lanka 
(COLOMBO SE ALLSHARE)  0.021 20.06  -12.97 1.19 1.29  46.77  229860.4 
Thailand 
(BANGKOK SET)  -0.016 12.01  -9.54  1.78  0.59  7.56  2659.2 
Turkey 
(ISE NATIONAL 100)  0.212 19.45  -18.10 3.06 0.17  6.64  1598.7 
UK 
(FTSE ALLSHARE)  0.017 5.22  -5.21 0.97  -0.18  6.06  1140.8 
USA 
(NYSE COMPOSITE)  0.038 5.31  -6.56 0.95  -0.16  7.05  1976.6 
Venezuela 
(VENEZUELA SE)  0.135 22.21  -10.24 1.87 1.39  19.12  32012.1 
All countries 
(unweighted) 
0.0463 33.39  -19.02 1.77 0.117  14.26  297303 
Notes: 
a)  Mean, Maximum, Minimum, and Std. Dev. are expressed in percentages. 
b)  Std. Dev. stands for sample standard deviation. 
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Table 3. Factor Returns’ Descriptive Statistics 
Benchmark Portfolios  Mean







World Market Portfolio 
(MSCI World) 
0.0244 4.86  -4.66 0.85 -0.07  6.07  1132.3  34.83 
Small 
(MSCI World)  0.0241 3.62  -3.99 0.70 -0.43  5.83  1012.39 29.04 
Large 
(MSCI World) 
0.0227 4.88  -4.81 0.87 -0.09  6.07  1095.36 38.32 
SMB 
(Small – Large)  0.0013  1.74  -2.50  0.44  -0.28  4.87 442.34 - 
Value 
(MSCI World) 
0.0272 6.33  -4.67 0.86 0.29  9.81  5594.89 31.61 
Growth 
(MSCI World)  0.0215 5.53  -5.59 0.95 0.03  7.52  2450.00 44.18 
HML 
(Value – Growth)  0.0057 6.33  -5.98 1.20 0.20  6.58  1559.49  - 
Notes: 
a)  Mean, Maximum, Minimum, and Std. Dev. are expressed in percentages. 
b)  Std. Dev stands for sample standard deviation. 
c)  Jarque-Berra denotes the normality statistic distributed as a Chi-square with two degrees of freedom. 
d)  CV stands for the Coefficient of Variation defined as the ratio of sample standard deviation to sample mean. 
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Table 4. Number of trading days on which terrorist attacks occurred
a,b 
Country  Count of terrorist attacks  Number of trading days on which 
terrorist attacks occurred 
Brazil  102 67 
Colombia  1543 624 
Egypt  326 187 
France  527 238 
Germany  274 128 
Greece  203 122 
India  1203 610 
Indonesia  236 127 
Israel  402 236 
Lebanon  249 155 
Mexico  258 148 
Pakistan  1132 416 
Peru  220 107 
Philippines  548 305 
Russia  514 331 
Spain  420 207 
Sri Lanka  517 288 
Thailand  126 77 
Turkey  649 315 
UK  538 309 
USA  200 106 
Venezuela  95 65 
Total   10282 5168 
Notes: 
a)  Attacks carried out either on weekends or days that stock markets were closed (national holidays) are not taken into account. 
b)  Multiple terrorist incidents on a given trading day are treated as a single event.   24
 
Table 5. Terrorism and Stock Returns: One-Factor World Model (1994-2004) 
 Random  Effects  PP-ARCH(1)
 a PP-ARCH(2) 
Regressor  Point estimate (z-score)
 b 
Mean equation 




















































































































c included  included  included 
Month effects  included  included  included 
Day effects  included  included  included 
Conditional Variance Equation 
2







,2 it σ −   - -  0.365
*** 
(76.61) 






Log Likelihood  -  -101901.30  -98872.40 
LR Test




a)  PP-ARCH stands for Pooled Panel Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticty. 
b)  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
c)  Year, Month, Day effects include 10, 11, 4 zero/one dummies identifying each year, month and day. 
d)  LR stands for Likelihood Ratio.    25
 
Table 6.  Terrorism and Stock Returns: Sensitivity Analysis based on the PP-ARCH(2) specification
a 
Model  Three-Factor World Mode
Regressor 
Mean equation 
, it S   -0.042
** 
(-2.40) 
, WMP t R   0.444
*** 
(43.47) 
,1 WMP t R −   0.120
*** 
(10.02) 
,2 WMP t R −   0.034
*** 
(2.72) 
,3 WMP t R −   0.060
*** 
(4.33) 
,4 WMP t R −   -0.006
 
(-0.49) 
,5 WMP t R −   0.022
** 
(2.25) 
, SMB t R   -0.040
*** 
(-3.73) 
,1 SMB t R −   0.123
*** 
(10.62) 
,2 SMB t R −   0.066
*** 
(5.37) 
,3 SMB t R −   0.032
*** 
(2.72) 
,4 SMB t R −   -0.003 
(-0.27) 
,5 SMB t R −   0.008
* 
(0.71) 
, HML t R   0.006
 
(1.31) 
,1 HML t R −   0.001 
(0.20) 
,2 HML t R −   -0.006 
(-0.80) 
,3 HML t R −   0.006 
(0.77) 
,4 HML t R −   -0.001 
(-0.15) 
,5 HML t R −   0.025
*** 
(3.15) 
,1 it R −   0.074
*** 
(28.40) 
,2 it R −   -0.013
*** 
(-6.19) 
,3 it R −   -0.001 
(-0.84) 
,4 it R −   0.022
*** 
(12.52) 
,5 it R −   0.002 
(1.19) 
intercept 0.111




Month effects  included 















Log Likelihood  -95298.98 
Observations 53302 
Notes:  
a)  PP-ARCH stands for Pooled Panel Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity.  
b)  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
c)  Year, Month, Day effects include 10, 11, 4 zero/one dummies identifying each year, month and day. 
d)  Crises dummies correspond to mexican, asian, russian, and scandals which are dummies attaining the value of unity for the periods (20
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Table 7.  Terrorism and Stock Returns by level of Psychosocial Impact (1998-2004) 





Model controlling for 
financial crises 
Regressor  Point estimate (z-score)
 a 
Mean equation 
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b included  included  included 
Month effects  included  included  included 
Day effects  included  included  included 
Crises Dummies
c -  -  included 
Conditional Variance Equation 
2












































Log Likelihood  -66852.21  -66806.41  -66801.07 
Observations  36302 36302 36302 
Notes:  
a)  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
b)  Year, Month, Day effects include 10, 11, 4 zero/one dummies identifying each year, month and day. 
c)  Crises dummies correspond to Russian and scandals which are dummies attaining the value of unity for 
the periods (11/08/1998 to 15/01/1999), and (15/4/2002 to 24/07/2002) respectively. 
d)  The statistic is distributed as a Chi-square with 1 degree of freedom.  
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Endnotes    
                                                 
1 Also known as macroterrorism describing terrorism incidents causing more than $1 billion of loss, or 500 
deaths (Woo, 2003).  
2 The conditional international capital asset pricing model would hold if capital markets were fully 
integrated and therefore the risk-adjusted expected return on all assets should be the identical across 
countries.  
3 “The employed definition of terrorism is the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain 
a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”, source: Global 
Terrorism Database 1.1, 1970-1997 user guide. 
4 Data for 1993 are not available.  
5 “In order to be considered as a “terrorist incident” the event had to have been committed by non-state 
actors, had to have been violent, and intentional. In addition the act must have met two of the following 
three criteria: (1) The act must have been aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. 
In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit did not satisfy this criterion. (2) There must have 
been evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or 
audiences) than the immediate victims. (3) The action must have been outside the context of legitimate 
warfare activities, i.e. the act must have been outside the parameters permitted by international 
humanitarian law (particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or noncombatants).”, 
source Global Terrorism Database II, 1998-204 user guide.   
6 During the period 1994-2004 terrorist incidents were recorded in a total of 180 countries.   
7 The table reports only results from the PP-ARCH(2) model for space conservation reasons. The full set of 
results for Random Effects and PP-ARCH(1) are available upon request by the authors.   